The EU and the Paris Climate Agreement: ambitions, strategic goals, and tactical approaches by Dröge, Susanne & Geden, Oliver
www.ssoar.info
The EU and the Paris Climate Agreement:
ambitions, strategic goals, and tactical approaches
Dröge, Susanne; Geden, Oliver
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dröge, S., & Geden, O. (2015). The EU and the Paris Climate Agreement: ambitions, strategic goals, and tactical
approaches. (SWP Comment, 29/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-432443
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The EU and the Paris Climate Agreement 
Ambitions, Strategic Goals, and Tactical Approaches 
Susanne Dröge and Oliver Geden 
In October 2014, the European Union has announced the objective of reducing green-
house gas emissions to at least 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. On March 6, 2015, 
the Council of Environmental Ministers reported this target as the EU’s official con-
tribution to the ongoing climate talks under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At around the same time, the European Commission 
unveiled a far-reaching and detailed proposal for the design of a new international 
climate agreement. In the process of adopting a formal EU negotiating mandate, the 
EU Member States will have to decide whether to support the Commission’s proposals. 
Their considerations will need to bring internal European interests in the area of 
climate policy and France’s role as host to the Paris UNFCCC Conference in December 
2015 into harmony with the overall EU climate policy ambitions. 
 
All 195 parties to the UNFCCC were asked 
to announce their “intended nationally 
determined contributions” (INDCs) to a 
new global climate agreement by the end 
of March 2015. But as of this deadline, only 
32 countries (EU-28, Switzerland, Norway, 
United States, Mexico) had actually done so. 
In April, Russia, Gabon, Liechtenstein, and 
Andorra followed. The EU had hoped that 
by adhering to the schedule, it would set 
an example to other states and underscore 
its credibility in fighting climate change. 
National climate protection commit-
ments in the UNFCCC process 
The INDCs have not been clearly defined 
in the UNFCCC negotiation process. On the 
one hand, they are supposed to serve as a 
means of communicating national climate 
targets well in advance of the Paris confer-
ence. On the other hand, they are a vehicle 
for promoting a comprehensive global agree-
ment for the post-2020 period that will en-
able all parties, not just the industrialized 
countries, to contribute to climate policy. 
Up to now, only the industrialized coun-
tries were bound to specific emissions 
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, 
while emerging economies like China and 
India were exempt. The primary objective 
in Paris will be to overcome this divide 
between the industrialized and developing 
nations when it comes to climate protec-
tion—even though it is still anchored in the 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
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Change (“Annex I” and “non-Annex I” coun-
tries). A flexible interpretation of the INDCs 
will thus also bring different ideas about 
the content of a new treaty into play. Not 
only will countries be able to announce 
their reduction targets; they can also pre-
sent other national measures—for instance, 
strategies for adapting to climate change 
or sectoral approaches to climate change 
mitigation such as energy policy programs. 
The EU—acting, as always, jointly in the 
arena of international climate policy—has 
presented a vision in its INDC for what its 
contribution to global climate protection 
could look like and how that vision could 
be realized in concrete terms. The EU views 
the INDCs primarily as a list of mitigation 
commitments and respective measures for 
limiting global warming to two degrees 
Celsius by the end of this century. The EU 
has stated explicitly that its own target is 
consistent with the objective of cutting 
global emissions by 50 percent between 
1990 and 2050, which would require the 
industrialized countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 
percent by the year 2050. The United States 
has also stated that its INDC for 2025 of 
reducing emissions by as much as 28 per-
cent fits into the long-term reduction strat-
egy up to 2050. Russia, in contrast, has not 
set a new climate goal. By 2030, it plans to 
reduce emissions to 25 to 30 percent below 
1990 levels. This is approximately the same 
level of emissions reductions it had set for 
2020 at the 2009 Copenhagen conference. 
Mexico surprised observers as the first 
emerging economy to formally announce 
its climate action pledge in advance of 
Paris: Mexico plans to peak its emissions 
growth in 2026 and cut the growth in ab-
solute emissions to 25 percent lower than 
“business as usual”—that is, what it would 
have been without instituting any climate 
protection measures by 2030. And, depend-
ing on the outcome of negotiations in Paris, 
Mexico might even increase its efforts fur-
ther. Mexico’s punctual and unexpectedly 
ambitious contribution has attracted a 
great deal of attention. 
The proposal of a “Paris Protocol”: 
Not a model for success 
Well over a week before the INDC decision 
by the EU Environment Ministers, the Euro-
pean Commission submitted a much more 
comprehensive proposal for how inter-
national climate policy should look after 
2020. In a formal Communication, the 
Commission presented a detailed strategy 
for EU negotiations aimed at producing a 
“Paris Protocol”—a kind of blueprint for 
a new global climate agreement. What is 
especially remarkable about the Commis-
sion’s proposal for a joint EU position is its 
choice of words. In United Nations (UN) 
usage, a “protocol” is an instrument that is 
binding under international law, and one 
that would have to be ratified by national 
parliaments for it to enter into effect. This 
kind of international agreement has been 
rejected by the US government for many 
years, and it is out of the question that the 
US Congress would ratify such a climate 
agreement in the foreseeable future. The 
political camps in the US are so deeply 
divided over climate policy that even the 
wrong choice of words in the Paris outcome 
could cause the currently very ambitious 
Obama administration severe difficulties. 
For the United States, the outcome of the 
Paris negotiations should essentially amount 
to a “binding instrument,” but it should be 
designed in such a way that the President’s 
signature is sufficient and Congress does 
not have to give its approval (see SWP Com-
ments 34/2014). 
What the Commission’s choice of words 
actually meant to signal was that in inter-
national climate policy, the EU is holding 
fast to its goal of maximum long-term emis-
sions reductions. Its Communication refers 
consistently to the scientific basis of EU col-
lective ambitions on mitigation, and sticks 
to the EU’s strategy at the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate summit of focusing global climate 
protection efforts on a science-based climate 
stabilization target that would be imple-
mented by international law. The European 
Commission is aware of the gap between 
emissions reductions necessary to meet the 
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two-degree upper limit and the expected 
overall level of voluntary mitigation targets 
submitted this year to the UNFCCC. It there-
fore wants to establish a global review pro-
cess for the INDCs under a new Paris agree-
ment and suggests that as of 2020, talks 
are to take place once every five years over 
whether and how the parties can gradually 
increase their mitigation pledges. 
The EU’s internal commitments 
up to 2030 
Up to now, the EU has built its reputation 
as a pioneer in climate policy on a practice 
of leading by example. In March 2007, two 
years before the Copenhagen climate sum-
mit, the European Council adopted an in-
tegrated energy and policy package whose 
centerpiece was a unilateral 20 percent 
reduction in greenhouse gases by 2020. 
Following the same logic, the heads of state 
and government then decided in October 
2014 to reduce emissions by 40 percent by 
2030 no matter what the outcome of the 
Paris summit. In the current context—in 
contrast to 2007—the European Council did 
not explicitly promise to increase its miti-
gation pledges in the case that the UN sum-
mit goes well. What it has agreed to do is 
merely to discuss the question of readjust-
ing the EU climate goal for 2030 in light of 
the outcomes of the Paris conference. Many 
Northern and Western European Member 
States would be willing to revise their tar-
gets upwards, and emphasize that 40 per-
cent is merely a minimum target. The 
Central and Eastern European countries, 
however, want to prevent any upward 
adjustments. 
If the EU entered into negotiations in 
Paris with the intention of trying to get a 
“protocol” passed, this would be risky for 
the future of the EU’s internal climate 
policy. Raising expectations of a protocol 
would almost inevitably result in wide-
spread disappointment with negotiation 
outcomes throughout Europe and a per-
ception of the EU as the “loser” in the nego-
tiations—largely independent of whatever 
detailed provisions such an alternative legal 
instrument would actually contain. The 
outcome would be similar to that of the 
Copenhagen summit in 2009: It would take 
away the justification for increasing the 
EU’s emissions reduction target in the near 
future. 
Other elements of the Commission’s 
proposal are not sufficiently attuned to 
the delicate balance in the EU’s internal 
climate policy process—for instance, the 
proposal to formally review the parties’ 
emissions mitigation targets every five 
years. This would mean that the EU would 
have to set an interim target for 2025. When 
one considers the polarizing tendencies 
in EU climate policy since 2010, which are 
generally only overcome through tedious 
consensus decision-making by the heads of 
state and government, it is currently almost 
unthinkable that the governments of the 
Central and Eastern European countries 
would be willing to consider short-term 
changes or increases in climate targets 
within Europe. For years now, deep-seated 
conflicts surrounding every fundamental 
and almost every specific decision in EU 
climate policy have severely undermined 
the image of the EU as a climate policy 
leader. The Commission is therefore working 
to limit the potential for conflict, for in-
stance, by postponing decisions on contro-
versial details of the implementation of 
EU energy and climate goals for 2030. 
These include a detailed regulation for the 
accounting of land use, land-use changes, 
and forestry (LULUCF), which is of enor-
mous significance for Member States with 
a strong agricultural sector. Depending on 
how accounting rules are formulated, they 
could significantly reduce the EU’s level of 
ambitions up to 2030. 
Global climate policy after 2020: 
A fresh start on a broad basis 
The Paris negotiations aim at bringing 
about a fresh start for the global climate 
regime under the UNFCCC. By the 2009 
Copenhagen conference at the very latest, 
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it had become patently clear that a science-
based approach to climate policy in the 
tradition of international environmental 
treaties is not viable. There are too many 
conflicting interests in climate policy to-
day: energy supply, development coopera-
tion, financial transfers, investment strat-
egies, and risk management among others. 
The goal in Paris is to reach agreement on 
binding climate protection targets, but the 
industrialized countries are not solely and 
decisively responsible for the success of this 
fresh start as they were under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The UNFCCC negotiations are in-
tended to involve as many states as possible, 
and for the period after 2020, all of the 
major emitters among the developing coun-
tries are supposed to be on board. The new 
climate regime is also planned to develop 
in successive stages after 2015, instead of 
being “set in stone” for a pre-defined period. 
For all these reasons, it has to contain 
mechanisms that push the parties toward 
greater transparency in their national 
climate policies, that establish a process 
for monitoring and readjusting the parties’ 
INDCs, and that give more attention to the 
concerns of the countries affected most 
by climate change. Most importantly, the 
industrialized countries will bear great 
responsibility as providers of climate policy 
funding. 
The EU as host: 
Facilitator and agenda-setter? 
In Paris, the EU will again face the chal-
lenge of balancing its role as host with 
its function of driving climate protection 
efforts forward. The host’s job is to facilitate 
a successful outcome of the conference 
by skillfully mediating between divergent 
interests. This may contradict the EU’s am-
bitions for the post-2020 climate regime. As 
host, France in particular cannot represent, 
much less promote the EU’s interests. For 
progress to be achieved on key points, it 
will be crucial for the EU Member States to 
work together closely and clarify the divi-
sion of roles among the Commission, the 
Luxembourg Council Presidency, and France 
well in advance of the Paris conference. This 
will require intensive consultation among 
Member States leading up to the adoption 
of an EU negotiation mandate (by fall 2015 
at the latest). For one thing, they will need 
to decide whether they want to follow the 
Directorate General for Climate Policy’s 
proposals for a global climate regime—which 
are relatively ambitious but offer little hope 
for consensus—in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
For another, they will have to decide to what 
extent they want to use these proposals as 
“bargaining chips” to persuade the United 
States, for instance, to compromise on 
other points. 
The climate targets and measures envi-
sioned by the EU, and the European Com-
mission’s proposals for a Paris agreement 
overlook the scope of regime change taking 
place at the global level, but they do con-
tain key elements of a future agreement. 
The EU can only succeed in balancing its 
roles as host and ambitious agenda-setter 
if it has established a clear internal division 
of labor. Germany should begin working 
at an early stage to ensure that the required 
regular review of INDCs also allows for short-
term increases in the level of ambitions 
within the EU. The German government 
should begin advocating as soon as possible 
for the EU to adopt a joint position on inter-
national climate finance. This question 
should be pushed forward in the context of 
the German G7 Presidency. The G7 summit 
in June should be used as an opportunity to 
intensify cooperation with the United States 
and to gather the remaining INDCs from the 
major industrialized countries. The latter 
will be instrumental in motivating the 
other major emitters among the emerging 
economies to follow Mexico’s example. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2015 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the authors’ views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by  
Deborah Anne Bowen 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 42/2015) 
SWP Comments 29 
May 2015 
4 
